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Meckes: Constructive Discharge

NOTE

TURNER V. ANHEUSER-BuSCH, INC.: CALIFORNIA
SUPREME COURT PROVIDES EMPLOYERS WITH A
MORE FAVORABLE CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
STANDARD

1. INTRODUCTION

In Turner v. Anheuser Busch, Inc./ the California Supreme Court held that James Turner's claim for constructive
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy failed as a matter of law. 2 The court held Turner could not show either objectively intolerable aggravated conditions on the job or that his
employer violated public policy.3 Because Turner did not state
a cognizable claim, the court reinstated the trial court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of Turner's employer AnheuserBusch, Incorporated (hereinafter "ABI,,).4 In reaching this conclusion, the court significantly modified the constructive discharge test by no longer allowing a plaintiff to use the
employer's constructive knowledge of intolerable or aggravated
working conditions as an element of a constructive discharge
claim.5 The court held that Turner could not prove a public
policy violation in part because a significant amount of time

1. Turner v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022 (Cal. 1994). (per Lucas,
C.J.; Arabian, Baxter, George, J.J., concurring; Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting;
Kennard J. dissenting, joined by Woods, J. (Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, assigned by the Acting Chairperson
of the Judicial Council).

2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1035.

5. Id. at 1029.

675

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 7

676

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:675

had passed between Turner's whistle-blowing activities and his
eventual resignation. 6 Moreover, the majority found Turner's
claim that his supervisors had used fabricated performance
appraisals to force his resignation untenable primarily because
the appraisals appeared valid on their face. 7 Consequently, an
employer may avoid a constructive discharge claim simply by
either waiting some time before engaging in conduct designed
to force an employer to resign, or by ensuring that any adverse
treatment of employees is supported by negative performance
appraisals. 8
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 3, 1989, James M. Turner tendered his resignation from ABI where he had worked in various capacities for
approximately eleven years. 9 Until his voluntary resignation
in 1981, Turner had worked as an industrial relations manager
at ABI's Los Angeles brewery for approximately six years. 10 In
January of 1984, Turner returned to ABI's wholesale operations division as ''branch off-premises coordinator" in the sales
department. 11
While there, Turner complained about illegal conduct allegedly perpetrated by his supervisor William Schmitt. 12
Turner claimed that Schmitt had violated alcoholic beverage
laws by giving gifts to liquor retailers 13 and by encouraging

6. [d. at 1032-34.
7. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1032
8. See infra Section VI.
9. Turner v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Cal. 1994).
10. [d. at 1024.
11. [d. The branch off-premises sales coordinator was responsible for coordinating sales activities with retailers who sold ABI products for consumption away
from the retailer's premises. [d. Turner's immediate supervisor was William
Schmitt. [d. Schmitt's supervisor was George Liakos. [d.
12. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1039 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
13. [d. Turner alleged that Schmitt gave liquor retailers Anheuser-Busch jackets and baseball tickets. [d.
Under the California Alcoholic Beverages Control Act, alcoholic beverage
wholesalers may not "[f]urnish, give or lend any money or other thing of value . . . to . . . any person engaged in operating, owning or maintaining any offsale licensed premises." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE, § 25502 (a)(2) (West 1985 &
Supp.). Alcoholic beverage manufacturers may not "[g]ive or furnish, directly or
indirectly, to any employee of any holder of a retail on-sale or ofT-sale license only
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ABI employees to remove advertisements posted by ABl's competitors. 14
In December 1984,15 Schmitt gave Turner an overall rating of "needs improvement" on his annual performance appraisal. 16 The appraisal stated that Turner failed to timely
and accurately complete important sales reports and to follow
through on sales and marketing projects. 17 Schmitt's supervisor George Liakos contended that the appraisal was based
solely on an objective review of Turner's performance during
anything of value for the purpose or with the intent to solicit, acquire, or obtain
the help or assistance of the employee to encourage or promote either the purchase or the sale of the alcoholic beverage sold or manufactured by the licensee
giving or furnishing anything of value, and any employee who accepts or acquires
anything of value contrary to the provisions of this subdivision is guilty of a misdemeanor." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25503(d) (West 1985).
Turner claimed that Liakos directed Schmitt to "have the customers make
payments for the material which was given in violation of the Alcohol and Beverage Commission regulations." Turner, 876 P.2d at 1039 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
In his declaration, Liakos claimed he terminated the investigation when Schmitt
told him that customer had paid for the jacket. [d. at nA.
Turner also claimed
to have complained when he received information that Schmitt had directed a
subordinate to give professional baseball tickets to another ABI customer. [d. at
1039. Turner stated that he passed this information along to Bill Richards, the
operations manager for the wholesale operations division. [d.
14. [d. at 1039-40. The court noted that interfering with product display and
advertising of competing sellers inside retail outlets might be construed as illegal
"ribbonizing." [d. at 1034 n.12. While the court criticized Turner for failing to
identify the proper statutory basis for his claim, the majority opinion itself cited
inapplicable sections of the California Business and Professions Code for the proposition that ribbonizing is illegal; i.e., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25502(b) (regulating the transfer of beer and wine wholesale licenses acquired before 1947) and
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25503.3 (allowing alcoholic beverage manufacturers to
advertise in trade publications and to serve samples at trade shows). In fact, it is
California Business and Professions Code § 25503.2(d) which prohibits so-called
"ribbonizing." Section 25503.2(d) provides that alcoholic beverage wholesalers may
rotate and manipulate only their own displays and products on the retailer's premises. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25503.2(d). See Markstein Distributing Co. v.
Rice, 135 Cal. Rptr. 255, 258 (Ct. App. 1976) (finding that liquor wholesaler's
tampering with the products of another manufacturer is illegal ribbonizing).
15. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1039 (Kennard, J., dissenting). This was Turner's
second performance appraisal since returning to ABI in January of 1984. [d. In
his first performance appraisal in June 1984, Turner received an overall rating of
"good," which the appraisal form defmes as "consistently dependable and competent performance of the job." [d.
16. [d. The appraisal form defines the "needs improvement" rating as "performance which does not meet minimum level of acceptability, and is not good
enough to warrant recognition or greater responsibility." [d. Schmitt performed the
appraisals and Schmitt's supervisor George Liakos approved them. [d.
17. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1039 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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the appraisal period. IS Believing he had performed competently, however, Turner claimed his supervisors gave him the adverse rating in retaliation for his complaints. 19
In July 1985, Liakos transferred Turner from the sales
department to the delivery department. 2o Although there was
no change in salary, Turner believed the transfer was in retaliation for his complaints. 21 Liakos claimed, however, that he
had transferred Turner because of his problems performing in
the sales department and because his experience made him
more suited to the delivery department. 22
From December 1985 to November 1987, Turner received
an overall rating of "good" in all performance appraisals. 23
However, in December 1988, Turner received a second overall
evaluation of "needs improvement.,,24 Liakos stated that Turner had recently become "an embittered and disgruntled employee" and that the performance appraisal reflected Turner's
"uncooperative, confrontational" attitude toward management
and his failure to timely complete assigned projects. 25
Turner, however, believed that his superiors had rated
him unfavorably in retaliation for his continuing opposition to
other improper activities he had observed while at the delivery
department. 26 Turner further believed that his superiors had
18. [d.
19. [d.

20. [d. at 1040. In his new job, Turner's duties included supervising the dayto-day activities of delivery department employees. [d. Turner was supervised by
Steve Garcia, the delivery manager. [d. Garcia reported to Bill Richards, the operations manager, who, in turn, reported to George Liakos. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1040
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
21. [d.
22. [d.
23. [d. at 1040. Bill Richards made all of Turner's evaluations at the delivery
department from 1985 to 1987. [d. In 1988, however, Steve Garcia and Richards
made Turner's appraisal. [d. All of Turner's appraisals were approved by George
Liakos. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1040 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
24. [d. A comparison of the 15 individual rating categories from 1987 and
1988 revealed a dramatic change. [d. In his 1987 evaluation, Turner was rated
"good" in eight categories, "very good" in six categories, and "excellent" in one
category. [d. Turner did not receive a single "needs improvement" in any of the 15
rating categories. Id. In the 1988 evaluation, however, Turner was rated "needs
improvement" in eight categories and "good" in the remaining seven. [d.
25. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1040 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
26. [d. at 1041. Turner specifically claimed that ABI was violating its union
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used the evaluations to begin "setting him up" for termination. 27 Turner alleged that ABI managers had used similar
methods in the past to force other ABI employees to leave the
company.28 As evidence of his superiors' intention to force him
out, Turner cited his supervisors' failure to bring the incidents
of poor performance to his attention when they occurred. 29
Shortly after receiving the 1988 appraisal, Turner tendered his letter of resignation. 30 In his declaration, Turner
stated that he had resigned because he believed his "chances
would be better" in future litigation if he preempted his eventual termination. 31
Shortly after his resignation, Turner filed suit against ABI
and certain individuals alleging, inter alia, constructive wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and breach of contract. 32 The trial court granted ABI's motion for summary

contract by subcontracting the washing of delivery trucks to a company owned by
delivery manager Steve Garcia, Turner's immediate supervisor. [d. Turner complained to Garcia, Bill Richards and George Liakos. [d. In another incident, Turner said he informed Liakos that ABI could be "in jeopardy" for withholding benefits under a "health and welfare benefits" provision of a union contract. [d. Turner
also believed ABI had violated the terms of some employment contracts that, in
Turner's words, provided for the clerical staff to "be paid for 40 hours and work
37 and a half." [d. Turner claimed to have complained to Liakos about this violation. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1041 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Turner also claimed to
have complained that the delivery department was not following organizational
policies regarding temperature control to prevent the spoilage of beer. [d.
27. [d.
28. [d. Turner recounted the case of an ABI employee Van Hoy who had reported that some ABI employees had fabricated sales documents. [d. Although Van

Hoy's report triggered an investigation, Van Hoy was subsequently given less responsibility and eventually left ABI. [d. at 1041 n.6 Turner also claimed that ABI
had fabricated the performance appraisals of other ABI employees Bosman, Hocking, Dunez (or Dunaj) and Peterson in attempts to coerce them to leave. Turner,
876 P.2d at 1041 n.6.
29. [d. at 1040-41. Turner claimed that, contrary to normal employment policies, his supervisors had only informed him about the incidents of poor performance at the time of his performance review conference. [d. at 1042.
30. [d. at 1025.
31. [d. at 1032.
32. [d. at 1025. Turner also alleged causes of action for age discrimination,
and both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Turner, 876
P.2d at 1025. ABI's motion for judgment on the pleadings resulted in the dismissal of Turner's emotional distress claim. [d. Turner voluntarily dismissed his claim
for age discrimination. [d.
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judgment on both the public policy and breach of contract
claims. 33
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment as to the contract claim, but reversed on
the public policy claim.34 The court held that Turner's complaint adequately alleged the existence of constructive wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.35 The court reasoned that a trier of fact could find that ABI deliberately created intolerable working conditions based on Turner's "long list"
of alleged actions and conditions. 36
On ABI's petition for review, the California Supreme Court
reversed the Court of Appeal's judgment as to the public policy
claim.37 Because the court found that no issue of material fact
existed, the court reinstated the trial court's grant of summary
judgment. 3s
III. BACKGROUND
To maintain a claim for tortious constructive discharge, a
plaintiff must prove: (1) an actual constructive discharge, and
(2) an underlying tort claim against the employer.39 A constructive discharge occurs when an employee is forced to resign
by employer actions or working conditions that are so intolerable as to compel a reasonable employee to resign.40 Since the
typical employment relationship is considered "at-will," a constructively discharged employee is not entitled to damages
unless he or she can prove an underlying claim in either
breach of contract or a tortious violation of public policy.41
33. [d.
34. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 656, 659 (Ct. App. 1992).
35. [d. at 658.
36. [d.
37. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1024.
38. [d.
39. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022,1030 (Cal. 1994).
40. [d. at 1025-27.
41. [d. at 1030. A wrongfully discharged employee may sue to recover damages
only if the public policy violated by the employer is fundamental and delineated in
a statutory or constitutional provision. [d. See infra note 46 for statutory support
and a definition of "at-will." See infra notes 63 - 75 for further discussion of violations of public policy in the constructive discharge context. While an employee
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A. CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE

When an employee resigns because of an employer's deliberate attempt to make employment conditions intolerable, a
constructive discharge is deemed to have occurred. 42 Since
actual discharge carries significant legal consequences for
employers,43 employers may attempt to avoid liability for
wrongful discharge by engaging in conduct to force the employee to resign.44 While the employee is the one who actually

claiming wrongful discharge may claim in either tort or breach of contract, the
scope of this note is specifically limited to discussion of tortious wrongful discharge
in violation of public policy.
42. 30 C. J. S. Employer-Employee Relationship § 53 (1992). Conditions must
be so intolerable that a reasonable person under the same circumstances would
also feel compelled to resign. [d.
43. Judicial holdings and legislative acts have given some discharged employees causes of action in either breach of contract or in tort or both. The California
Supreme Court has recognized that employers may be liable if they discharge
employees in violation of an implied contractual promise not to terminate without
good cause or for breaching the parties' general duties of good faith and fair dealing. Foley v. Interactive Data, 765 P.2d 373, 385, 401 (Cal. 1988). State and federal statutes also impose liability upon employers for discharging employees under
certain circumstances. For example, the California Fair Employment and Housing
Act prohibits discharge because of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical or mental disability, medical condition, marital status, or sex. CAL.
GoV'T CODE § 12921 (West Supp. 1996). Likewise, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and 1991 prohibits termination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3 (1989). Both California and federal
laws prohibit the discharge of a female because of pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 12945.2(1)(1) (West Supp. 1996»; 42
U.S.C.S. § 2000e(k) (1989). California law also prohibits, for example, tennination
of employees for exercising their rights under the Workers' Compensation laws,
CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a(1) (West Supp. 1996); because of absence while serving as
an election officer on election day, CAL. ELEC. CODE § 1655 (West Supp. 1996); because an employee takes time off to serve as a juror or appear as a witness, CAL.
LAB. CODE § 230 (West 1989); because an employee has joined a labor union, CAL.
LAB. CODE § 923 (West 1989); because an employee takes time off for emergency
duty as a volunteer firefighter, CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.3 (West Supp. 1996); or because an employee in the private sector has refused to submit to a polygraph test,
CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West 1989). Furthennore, the California Supreme Court
has recognized that a employer will be liable in tort if it discharges an employee
in violation of public policy. See infra notes 63 - 75 and accompanying text for
further discussion of tortious wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
Federal statutes also prohibit termination for a variety of reasons. For example, an employer may not terminate an employee to avoid paying pension or
welfare benefits, 29 U.S.C.S. § 1140 (1990); because an employee engages in union
activity, 29 U.S.C.S. § 158(a)(1) (1988); or because an employee in the private
sector refuses to submit to a polygraph test, 29 U.S.C.S. § 2002 (1990).
44. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1025.
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says, "I quit," the employer is deemed to have actually severed
the employment relationship.45
California law presumes an "at-will" relationship when the
length of the employment relationship is not provided in the
employment contract.4S Thus, even when an employer forces
an employee to resign, the employee will typically have no
cause of action against the employer even though the discharge
is legally regarded as a firing rather than a resignation. 47 To
maintain an action in wrongful constructive discharge, therefore, an employee must show not only that he or she was
forced to resign, but also that he or she is entitled to obtain
damages for an underlying tort or for breach of contract. 46
Although California has long recognized that a resignation
coerced by the employer is equivalent to a discharge,49 the
California appellate courts did not define the elements of constructive discharge until 1987 in Brady v. Elixir Industries. 50
In Brady, the plaintiff-employee contended not only that her
employer's repeated sexual harassment forced her to resign,
but also that her employer's actions constituted a tortious
constructive discharge in violation of public policy.51 To establish constructive discharge, the Brady court held that an employee must show that actions of the employer or the conditions of employment were so intolerable or aggravated at the
time of the employee's resignation that a reasonable person in

45. [d.

46. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1989). The California Labor Code defines an
"at-will" employment contract as "(a)n employment, having no specified term (that)
may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other. Employment
for a specified term means an employment for a period greater than one month."
[d.

47. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1030
48. [d.

49. Moreno v. Cairns, 127 P.2d 914, 916 (Cal. 1942).
Whenever a person is severed from his employment by
coercion, the severance is effected not by his own will but
by the will of a superior. A person who is forced to resign
is thus in the position of one who is discharged, not of
one who exercises his own will to surrender his employment voluntarily.
[d. at 534-35.
50. 242 Cal. Rptr. 324 (Ct. App. 1987).
51. [d. at 325.
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the employee's position would also have resigned. 52 Furthermore, the court also required that an employee bringing a
constructive discharge claim prove that the employer had either actual or constructive knowledge that the employee found
the conditions of his or her job intolerable. 53 The California
Courts of Appeal subsequently expanded the test developed in
Brady to encompass contract as well as tort claims. 54 Thus, a
constructively discharged employee may sue for breach of both
express employment contracts55 and implied covenants not to
discharge without good cause or not to discharge except in
accordance with specified procedures. 56
The Brady court discussed the constructive discharge standards of several jurisdictions, including the federal district and
appellate courts, the California Fair Employment and Housing
Commission and other states. 57 Although these cases uniformly required the circumstances of employment to be so aggravated or intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign, courts take divergent views on whether an
employee must have proof that the employer actually intended
that the adverse conditions cause the employee to resign.58

52. [d. at 328.
53. Brady, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 328. The Brady court held that an employee need
not prove the employer intentionally created intolerable working conditions specifically to cause the employee to resign. [d. The court found proving employer intent
too stringent a standard. [d. Thus, the court adopted the requirement that the
employer at least have either actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged intolerable circumstances. [d.
54. Zilmer v. Carnation, Co. 263 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Ct. App. 1989); Soules v.
Cadam, Inc., 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6 (Ct. App. 1991).
55. Zilmer, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
56. Soules, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 11.
57. Brady, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
58. [d. For cases not requiring proof of employer intent see, e.g., Calhoun v.
Acme Cleveland Corp., 798 F.2d 559, 561-563 (1st Cir. 1986); Goss v. Exxon Office
Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984); Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617
F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980); Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 360, 361-362
(9th Cir. 1987); Nolan v. Cleland, 686 F.2d 806, 813 (9th Cir. 1982); Derr v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 343-344 (lOth Cir. 1986); Garner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
807 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir. 1987); Civil Rights Div., etc. v. Vernick, etc., 643
P.2d 1054, 1055 (Ariz. 1982); Lewis v. Oregon Beauty Supply Co., 714 P.2d 618,
621 (Ore. App. 1986); Atlantic Richfield v. D. of Columbia Com'n, 515 A.2d 1095,
1101 (D.C. App. 1986). For cases requiring some employer intent, see e.g., Bristow
v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985); Yates v. AVCO Corp.,
819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987); Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250,
1256 (8th Cir. 1981); First Judicial, etc. v. Iowa, etc., 315 N.W.2d 83, 87-89 {Iowa
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Like the majority of jurisdictions, the Brady court found that
requiring the employee to prove the employer had actual
knowledge or intent was too stringent a standard. 59 Nevertheless, the Brady court determined that some proof of employer
knowledge is necessary to insure the parties at least attempt a
peaceful, on-the-job resolution of the problem. 60 Thus, the
court a.dopted a middle-ground approach by requiring evidence
that the employer had either actual or constructive knowledge61 of the intolerable conditions. 62
B. DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
An employee suing for tortious constructive discharge
must show not only intolerable conditions and employer knowledge, but must also show that the discharge in question violated a firmly established, fundamental and substantial public
policy expressed in constitutional or statutory provisions. 63

California's tortious discharge doctrine originated in
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters. 54 In
Petermann, an employer discharged its business agent for
refusing to perjure himself before a state legislative committee. 65 The court of appeal held that despite the employee's "atwill" status, allowing the union to discharge the employee for
refusing to violate the law would be "obnoxious to the interests
of the state and contrary to public policy and sound morality."66 Similarly, in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield CO.,67 the
California Supreme Court held that an employer violated pub-

1982).
59. Brady, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
60. Id.
61. The California Civil Code states that "Every person who has actual notice
of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular
fact, has constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases in which, by prosecuting
such inquiry, he might have learned such fact." CAL. CML CODE § 19 (West
1982).
62. Brady, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
63. Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, 824 P.2d 680, 687-88 (Cal. 1992).
64. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. App. 1959).
65.Id.
66. Id. at 27.
67. 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980).
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lic policy for firing an employee for refusing to participate in
an illegal price fixing scheme. 68
The California courts have reached a different conclusion
when the discharge did not violate a policy inuring to the public at large but which, instead, served only the more limited
interests of the employer itself.69 In Foley v. Interactive Data,
Corp.,70 the employee claimed his employer violated public
policy when it discharged him for informing his supervisor that
a prospective managerial employee was under investigation for
embezzlement. 71 Although the employee contended that he
had a duty to report this information as the employer's agent,
the court found that the employer violated no public policy
since the agency relationship between the parties was of no
interest to the public at large. 72
The California Supreme Court further narrowed the kinds
of actions that violate public policy in Gantt v. Sentry Insurance. 73 The court held that the employer's action must violate
either a constitutional or statutory provision, reasoning that an
employer ought to know when a public policy might be implicated. 74 Thus, a claim for tortious constructive discharge that
does not implicate a fundamental public policy delineated in
either a statutory or constitutional provision is subject to adjudication as a matter oflaw. 75
IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS
In Turner,76 the California Supreme Court reanalyzed the
California constructive discharge standard. 77 Although the
court confirmed that the employee's working conditions must

68. [d.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

76.
77.

Foley v. Interactive Data Corp, 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
[d.
[d. at 375.
[d. at 380.
Gantt, 824 P.2d at 683-89 (Cal. 1992).
[d. at 687.
Turner, 876 P.2d at 1033.
Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022 (Cal. 1994).
[d. at 1025-28.
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be objectively intolerable, the court modified the Brady 78 test
by ruling that an employer must have actual knowledge of the
employee's intolerable circumstances to support a constructive
discharge claim.79 The Turner court also sought to clarify
whether an employee could claim constructive discharge as a
matter of law if the employee did not resign within a specified
time period after the onset of the intolerable conditions. 80 Finally, the court analyzed Turner's claim and found that
Turner's claim failed as a matter of law for two reasons. 81 The
first "fatal flaw,,82 in Turner's claim was his inability to show
that his working conditions were objectively intolerable. 83 The
court also found Turner's claim was untenable as a matter of
law because he could show no connection between public policy
violations by ABI and his eventual resignation. 54
A. THE CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE TEST

Before reviewing the merits of Turner's claim, the court
reviewed the evolution of California's constructive discharge
doctrine. 85 The court attempted to clarify when circumstances
would be so intolerable that they would compel an employee to
resign.86 The court then considered whether an employee
must prove the employer had actual knowledge, rather than
mere constructive knowledge, that the employee considered his
or her working conditions intolerable. 87 In analyzing Turner's
claim, the court considered and specifically disapproved case
law that held an employee could not maintain a claim for constructive discharge if the employee failed to resign within a
specific time period after the onset of the intolerable circumstances. 88

78. 242 Cal. Rptr. 324 (Ct. App. 1987).
79. Turner at 1028-29.
80. Id. at 1031-32.
81. Id. at 1031.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1031-32
84. Id. at 1032-35.
85. Turner v. Anheu8er-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1025-29 (Cal. 1994).
86. Id. at 1027. See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
87. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1027-29.
88. Id. at 1031.
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1. Working conditions must be objectively "intolerable"
To maintain a constructive discharge action, the court
reiterated that the employee must show working conditions so
objectively intolerable that they would have compelled a reasonable employee under the same circumstances to resign.89
The court noted, however, that all jobs have inherent frustrations, challenges and disappointments. 9o Therefore, an employee is protected only from unreasonably harsh conditions
above and beyond those suffered by co-workers. 91 The court
ruled that single, trivial or isolated acts of misconduct will not
usually make job conditions sufficiently intolerable to force an
employee to resign.92 Instead, the proper focus is whether a
reasonable person under the same circumstances would have
had any reasonable alternative except to resign, not simply
whether resignation was one reasonable option. 93 Thus, the
primary question is whether the employer has coerced the
employee's resignation by subjecting the employee to intolerable working conditions. 94
In determining whether intolerable conditions had compelled Turner to resign, the court asked whether Turner's
claim should be time-barred as a matter of law under the rule
announced in Panopulos v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.95 Un89. [d. at 1027. For this test, the court relied on Slack v. Kanawha County
Housing, 423 S.E.2d 547 (W.Va. 1992). The Slack court collected and analyzed
state and federal cases from several jurisdictions. [d. at 555-58. The court discovered general agreement that one essential element in any constructive discharge
claim is proof that the employee's working conditions were so intolerable that any
reasonable employee would resign rather than endure such conditions. [d. at 556.
90. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1026-27.
91. [d. at 1027.
92. [d. The court held that a "poor performance rating or a demotion, even
when accompanied by reduction in pay, does not by itself trigger a constructive
discharge." [d. See also Valdez v. City of Los Angeles, 282 Cal. Rptr. 726, 723 (Ct.
App. 1991) (holding that failure to promote an employee due to unlawful discrimination will not support a finding of constructive discharge); Soules v. Cadam, Inc.,
3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 12 (Ct. App. 1991) (Holding that a demotion accompanied by reduction in pay and negative performance evaluations does not constitute constructive discharge).
93. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1026. See also Rochlis v. Walt Disney Co., 23 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 793, 798 (Ct. App. 1993) (Holding that an employee who contended he
was underpaid for a difficult executive position could not assert constructive discharge claim).
94. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1026-27.
95. 264 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1989). In Panopulos, the plaintiff filed suit for

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996

13

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 7

688

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:675

der Panopulos, a limitations period begins to run at the time
the intolerable actions or conditions that caused the resignation become known to the employee. 96 This time period tracks
the statute of limitations for whatever cause of action the employee might have as a result of the intolerable circumstances.
Under this rule, the employee claiming constructive discharge
must have resigned within this time period, or his or her constructive discharge claim will fail as a matter of law. 97
The Turner, court rejected Panopulos finding that any reliance on the applicable limitations period to determine whether
employment conditions were indeed intolerable would be unduly arbitrary.9s The court explained that although the length of
time an employee remains on the job after the onset of intolerable circumstances may be a factor in determining whether
working conditions were actually intolerable, an employee's
failure to resign within this period does not prove the
employee's resignation was unreasonable as a matter of law. 99
The Turner majority agreed with the Panopulos decision, however, to the extent that an "outer limit" exists after the onset
of intolerable conditions beyond which an employee may not
remain on the job and still claim constructive discharge. loo

constructive discharge after resigning his job in 1983. [d. at 813. The plaintiff
alleged that intolerable working conditions from 1978 until the time he resigned in
1983 injured his psyche and his back. [d. The court held that too much time had
passed between the onset of the intolerable circumstances and the employee's
resignation. [d. at 817. The court wrote: "[T]he applicable limitations period must
constitute an outer limit beyond which an employee may not, as a matter of law,
remain employed after the onset of allegedly intolerable conditions and thereafter
maintain a claim for wrongful constructive discharge." [d. The court reasoned that
"sound policy requires that there be a limit beyond which claims such as that of
plaintiff here may not be asserted." [d at 816. The court held his suit time-barred
since the longest applicable limitations period was four years and the plaintiffs
transfer had occurred more than four years before his resignation. 264 Cal. Rptr.
at 816.
96. [d. at 817.
97. [d.
98. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1031.
99. [d. The Turner court only disapproved Panopulos to the extent that it prescribed the statute of limitations as a time limit on an employee's decision to
"weather the storm." [d.
100. [d.
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2. Employer must have actual knowledge of the employee's
intolerable working conditions

The Turner Court significantly modified the Brady test
byallowing employees to proceed on a constructive discharge
claim only if the employer has actual knowledge of the alleged
intolerable working conditions. 101 While the Brady line of cases allowed a constructive discharge claim to proceed on an
allegation the employer had actual or constructive knowledge
of the employee's intolerable conditions, the Turner court ruled
that the employee must prove that the employer either intentionally created or knowingly permitted the intolerable working conditions to continue.102 The Turner majority found that
this actual knowledge requirement better served the goal articulated in Brady of insuring the parties attempt to resolve the
conflict before a lawsuit is required. 103
In Brady,l04 the court had required that the employer
have either actual or constructive knowledge to ensure that the
employer and an employee attempt a peaceful on-the-job resolution of any workplace conflicts.105 The Turner court, however, stated that requiring the plaintiff to show that the employer had actual notice of the intolerable conditions was a more
appropriate standard if the courts wished the parties to work
out their differences prior to the onset of a lawsuit. 106 The
court reasoned that requiring employees to notify a person in
authority about the intolerable situation would give employers,
unaware of any problems, an opportunity to correct any objectionable conditions or circumstances the employee finds objectionable prior to legal action by the employee. 107 Furthermore, the court determined that the actual knowledge requirement would prevent employers from shielding themselves from

101. [d. at 1028. For purposes of this standard, the requisite knowledge or
intent must exist on the part of either the employer or those persons who effectively represent the employer, i.e., its officers, directors, managing agents, or supervisory employees. [d. at 1029.
102. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1029.
103. [d. at 1028.
104. [d. at 1029; Brady v. Elixer Indus., 242 Cal. Rptr. 324 (Ct. App. 1987).
105. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1029 (citing Brady, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 328).
106. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1029.
107. [d.
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constructive discharge lawsuits by deliberately ignoring a situation that has become intolerable to a reasonable employee. 108 Thus, the court concluded that the actual knowledge
requirement would more effectively serve the favorable policies
set forth in Brady. 109
The Turner court based its modification of the knowledge
requirement on the idea that constructive discharge is ultimately a coerced resignation. llo While noting that proof that
the employer intended to create intolerable working conditions
would be evidence that the employer coerced the employee's
resignation, III the court declined to require proof that the
employer expressly intended to cause the resignation. l12 The
court reasoned that requiring employees to produce evidence
that the employer intended to constructively discharge them
would preclude some meritorious claims since an employer is
unlikely to announce a constructive discharge strategy "from
the rooftops."1l3 On the other hand, the court reasoned an
employer's actual knowledge of the existence of intolerable
conditions and its failure to address them would be strong
circumstantial evidence that the employee's resignation was, in
fact, employer-coerced. 1l4
B. TuRNER'S CLAIM FOR CONSTRUCTIVE WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
IN VIOLATION OF PuBLIC POLICY IS FATALLY FLAWED

The court found two "fatal flaws" in Turner's claim for
constructive wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.1l5 First, Turner presented insufficient evidence that his
working conditions were so intolerable that they would have
compelled a reasonable person under the same circumstances

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1027-28.
111. Id. at 1028.
112. Id. Although many federal and state courts do, in fact, require express
proof that the employer intended to cause the employee's resignation. See supra
notes 57 - 62 and accompanying text for further discussion of employer intent in
this context.
113. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1028.
114. Id.
115. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1031 (Cal. 1994).
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to resign.116 Second, even assuming Turner could have shown
intolerable working conditions, he could not show any relationship between his whistle-blowing activities and his resignation
and thus could not show ABI violated any public policy.ll7
Standing alone, either of these flaws would have entitled ABI
to summary judgment. 118
1. Conditions of Turner's job were
intolerable

not aggravated or

The Turner majority held that none of the following three
conditions taken alone or together constituted sufficiently under constructive discharge: (1) the illegal acts of Turner's fellow employees which he allegedly witnessed and reported in
1984; (2) his 1985 reassignment; or (3) his low performance
rating in 1988. 119 Since none of these issues contained a triable issue of material fact, the court found no merit in Turner's
constructive discharge action. 120
The court ruled that, without more, a reasonable employee
should not be so offended by the "mere existence" of illegal
conduct in the workplace that he or she would reasonably feel
compelled to resign.l21 According to the majority, a reasonable person in Turner's circumstances would not have felt compelled to resign since Turner's supervisors had never required,
or even requested, that he take part in any illegal activity.122
Furthermore, violations of state law regulating the economic
and contractual relationships between an alcoholic beverage
manufacturer and its customers and competitors was not the
kind of obnoxious or aggravated activity that might cause a
reasonable employee to feel compelled to resign.123
The fact that approximately three years had passed be116. ld. at 1031-32.
117. ld. at 1032-34.
118. ld. at 1031.
119. ld. at 1031-32.
120. ld.
121. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1032.
122. ld.
123. ld. The court noted that ABI had, in fact, taken action on some of
Turner's complaints. ld.
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tween Turner's reassignment to the delivery department (allegedly in retaliation for his complaints about illegal activities)
and his eventual resignation was found to be strong evidence
indicating that neither Turner nor the hypothetical reasonable
person would have regarded the working conditions at ABI as
intolerable. 124
The court also rejected Turner's claim that his 1988 performance evaluation formed a basis for his constructive discharge
claim. 125 Since a properly managed business must occasionally review, criticize, demote, transfer, and discipline its employees,126 a single, negative performance rating should not create circumstances so intolerable that a reasonable employee
would be forced to resign.127 Thus, Turner could not claim
that ABI managers had used negative performance appraisals
to force him from the company.128
Finally, the court determined that even considering all of
the miscellaneous charges of misconduct together, no pattern
of continuous harassment existed sufficient to maintain a
claim for constructive discharge. 129 For more than three years
after he had complained of illegal activity, Turner received
good performance reviews and increases in compensation. ISO
Moreover, the court noted, Turner had admitted resigning
because he had thought ABI was "setting him up" for termination and he had believed he would fare better in future litigation if he were to preempt his discharge. 13l Thus, the court
concluded that Turner had resigned voluntarily since his work-

124. [d. See also Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co., 683 F.2d 922, 926 (5th Cir.
1982) (holding that no constructive discharge occurs when alleged misconduct occurred several months prior to resignation); Wagner v. Sanders Assoc., Inc., 638 F.
Supp. 742 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that passage of time between allegedly intolerable condition and resignation "goes a long way toward destroying" assertion that
conditions were intolerable).
125. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1032.
126. [d.
127. [d. See also Soules, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 12 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that an
employee claiming constructive discharge must show aggravating factors such as a
continuous pattern of discrimination since, generally, a single, isolated incident of
sexual harassment will not create sufficiently intolerable circumstances).
128. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1032.
129. [d.
130. [d.
131. [d.
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ing conditions could not have compelled him to resign if his
resignation was strategic and not coerced. 132 Thus, the court
found Turner's failure to produce any evidence to show intolerable circumstances alone sufficient to defeat his constructive
discharge claim. 133

2. ABI did not violate public policy
Even if Turner could have shown intolerable circumstances, the court ruled that summary judgment was proper since
Turner had not shown that ABI had tortiously violated public
policy. 1M To prove that a discharge violates public policy, the
majority reiterated that an employee must show that the dismissal contravened a policy that is (1) fundamental/ 35 (2)
beneficial to the public at large,136 and (3) embodied in a statute or constitutional provision. 137 Tort claims of this type typically arise when ail employer discharges an employee for refusing to violate a statute at the employer's request, for exercising a statutory right or privilege, or for performing a legal
duty. 138
The court found that even if Turner could show that supervisors had discharged him in retaliation for his complaints
about ABI's internal practices or ABI's violations of its collective bargaining agreements, this did not amount to a violation
of fundamental public policy since the benefit of these policies
served only ABI or its employee unions and not the public at
large. 139 The tort of wrongful discharge, the court stated, is
not a tool for the enforcement of the employer's contracts or

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1032-33.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1032-33. The interest advanced by the policy must inure to the
benefit of the public at large, rather than simply to the individual employer or
employee. Id. See also Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 379-80 (Cal.
1988) (holding that an employee discharged for complying with the fiduciary duty
owed by an agent to his principle does not implicate public policy since the agency
relationship does not benefit the public at large).
137. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1033; see also Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, 824 P.2d
680, 687-88 (Cal. 1992).
138. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1033.
139. Id.
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internal policies. 140 Therefore, because none of these activities
involved a fundamental public policy, Turner's claim for constructive discharge based on these allegedly improper activities
failed. 141
Turner's allegation that his superiors violated the California Alcohol Beverage Control Act (hereinafter "ABC Act")142
was likewise found insufficient to support his claim for constructive discharge. l43 The court first ruled Turner's implication of the ABC Act was insufficient to create a triable issue of
material fact since he failed to provide citations to the specific
statutory or constitutional authority giving rise to his public
policy claim.l44 While the court found that retaliation for reporting violations of the ABC Act 'might involve a fundamental
public policy/45 Turner's action still failed because he demon-

140. [d.
141. [d.
'142. The California Alcohol Beverage Control Act is codified in CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 23000 et seq (West 1985).
143. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1034. Turner complained that ABI personnel had violated the ABC Act by removing competitors' advertisements and by giving gifts to
retailers. [d.
144. [d. at 1033. Turner alleged that by giving gifts to retailers, ABI had violated "Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms laws." [d. Turner also alleged that ABI violated "ABC Act § 25503" by instructing its sales personnel to remove or tear down
its competitors' products and advertising and making consignment sales of alcohol.
[d. Although criticizing Turner for failing to cite specific statutes violated by ABI
or citing incorrect statutory authority given the facts of this case, the court itaelf
also cited incorrect statutory authority for the alleged violations. See supra note 13
for further discussion of possible statutory provision allegedly violated by ABI.
145. Although Turner simply claimed ABI violated "Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearm laws," Turner, 876 P.2d at 1033, the California Alcoholic Beverage Control Act
does prohibit wholesalers from giving gifts to liquor retailers. Bus. & Prof. Code,
§§ 25502(a)(2) (West Supp. 1996), 25503(d) (West 1985). Interfering with a
competitor's advertising display could be considered illegal ribbonizing under CAL.
BuS. & PROF. CODE § 25502.3 as construed in Markstein Distributing v. Rice, 135
Cal. Rptr. 255, 258 (Ct. App. 1976).
In its declaration of purpose, the Alcohol Beverage Control Act states:
This division is an exercise of the police powers of the
State for the protection of the safety, welfare, health,
peace, and morals of the people of the State, to eliminate
the evils of unlicensed and unlawful manufacture, selling,
and disposing of alcoholic beverages, and to promote temperance in the use and consumption of alcoholic beverages. It is hereby declared that the subject matter of this
division involves in the highest degree the economic, social, and moral well-being and the safety of the State and
of all its people. All provisions of this division shall be
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strated no connection between his complaints and the negative
performance appraisal that allegedly caused him to resign.l46
The court noted that no evidence indicated that management
had regarded him as a disloyal employee or a troublemaker
despite his reporting activity during the three-year period
between Turner's transfer and his resignation. l47 Also important to the Turner majority was the fact that ABI had not
simply dismissed Turner's complaints out-of-hand. l48 Instead,
ABI had investigated Turner's complaints and had made its
own determinations that no illegal activity had taken
place. 149 The court concluded that because no apparent connection was shown between the alleged ABC Act violations and
Turner's 1988 performance appraisal, the only reasonable
inference was that Turner's negative appraisal simply reflected
a bona fide assessment of his job performance and did not
implicate a fundamental public policy.150

v.

DISSENTING OPINION

In Turner, Justice Kennard dissented from both the
majority's decision to require an employer's actual knowledge
in a constructive discharge claim,151 and the majority's rein-

liberally construed for the accomplishment of these purposes.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE, § 23001 (West 1985).
146. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1034.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1034-35.
151. Turner v. Anheuser Busch, Inc. 876 P.2d 1022, 1035-43 (Cal. 1994). (per
Kennard, J., dissenting, joined by Woods J. and joined in part by Mosk, J.)
Justice Mosk, joining Justice Kennard's dissent, criticized the court for abandoning the constructive knowledge component of the constructive discharge test. Id.
at 1035. Mosk also stated that he was in accord with Justice Kennard on the
question of whether ABI's illegal marketing practices in 1984 contributed to cause
Turner's resignation in 1988. Id.
Justice Mosk, however, concurred with the majority's decision because he
believed Turner did not suffer objectively intolerable conditions of employment as a
matter of law. Id. Mosk reasoned that Turner's single "needs improvement" performance appraisal after four years of good evaluations did warrant his belief that he
would subsequently receive a series of poor performance appraisals that would blot
his employment record. Id. Furthermore, Mosk believed Turner's "damaging" admission that he had resigned for strategic reasons was further evidence that his
working conditions were not "intolerable.» Id. at 1035.
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statement of the trial court's grant of summary judgment. 152
Instead, she argued that the courts should hold an employer
responsible when proof is offered that the employer had constructive as well as actual knowledge of intolerable working
conditions. 153 Furthermore, she argued summary judgment
was improper since Turner had presented sufficient evidence
for a jury to conclude that an orchestrated campaign to force
him from his job made his work conditions objectively intolerable. IM Finally, despite the majority's finding to the contrary,
the dissent argued that Turner had indeed presented sufficient
evidence to prove a causal relationship between ABI's alleged
violations of the ABC Act in 1984 and Turner's 1989 resignation.155

A.

CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE STANDARD SUPPORTED IN LAw
AND REASON

Justice Kennard disagreed with the majority's decision to
require actual employer knowledge as an element of a constructive discharge claim for two reasons.156 First, employer
knowledge was not at issue in Turner since Turner had alleged
his employers actually intended to drive him from the company.157 Second, the actual knowledge requirement adopted in
Turner erroneously departed from the test uniformly applied
by the California appellate courts and supported by jurisprudence on both the state and federal levels. 15s
The dissent first contended that this case was an improper
vehicle for modifying the standard of employer knowledge since
the issue of whether ABI had constructive or actual knowledge
152. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1038-43 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
153. [d. at 1036-38.
154. [d. at 1041-42.
155. [d. at 1042-43.
156. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1036-38 (Cal. 1994)
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
157. [d. at 1036.
158. [d. Prior to Turner the following California opinions had adopted the test
for constructive discharge developed in Brady v. Elixer Indus., 242 Cal. Rptr. 328
(Ct. App. 1987): Rochlis v. Walt Disney Co. 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 793, 798 (Ct. App.
1993), Soules v. Cadam, Inc. 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 10 (Ct. App. 1991), Valdez v. City
of Los Angeles, 282 Cal. Rptr. 726, 735-36 (Ct. App. 1991), Zilmer v. Carnation
Co., 263 Cal. Rptr. 422, 425-26 (Ct. App. 1989)
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was not at issue. 159 Because Turner alleged that his supervisors had intended their actions to lead to his eventual termination, the dissent reasoned that Turner had alleged ABI had
actual knowledge. 160 The issue of an employer's constructive
knowledge should arise only in cases where the employee's
allegedly intolerable working conditions were unknown to the
employing company's management or the employee's supervisors. 161
The dissent next contended that proof of constructive
knowledge is appropriate where an employer is responsible for
an employee's resignation. Kennard reasoned that if an employer is responsible for working conditions so intolerable they
force an employee to resign, the employer has sufficient notice
to be liable in a constructive discharge claim. 162 For authority, Justice Kennard cited the constructive discharge standard
applied by federal courts in sexual harassment claims brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter
"Title VII,,).l63 Under what Kennard characterized as the
"majority rule" in Title VII cases, an employee is constructively
discharged when intolerable working conditions "for which the
employer is responsible" cause the employee to resign.l64

159. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1036 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1036-37.
163. Id. at 1036-37. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is codified in 42
U.S.C.S. § 2000e et seq. (l989).
164. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1036 (Kennard, J., dissenting; emphasis by Justice
Kennard). Kennard attributes her assertion that employer "responsibility" is an
element of the constructive discharge tests employed by a majority of the federal
circuits to BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARAsSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAw 260 (1992). Lindemann and Kadue cite several sexual harassment
cases as authority for the proposition that employer responsibility for the intolerable conditions will support a constructive discharge claim under federal civil rights
laws. Id. Whether the employer had any knowledge, actual or constructive, was
not central to Lindemann and Kadue's analysis, however. Instead, the question
explored by Lindemann and Kadue is whether an employee must necessarily prove
the employer's intent to cause the employee's resignation. Id.
Only one case cited by Lindemann and Kadue accorded with Justice
Kennard's views on employer responsibility. In Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., the court
held that employment conditions that were foreseeably intolerable to the employer
would support employer responsibility for an employee's resignation. 796 F.2d 340,
344 (lOth Cir. 1986). Lindemann and Kadue also cite Goss v. Exxon Office Sys.,
747 F.2d 885, 887 (3d Cir. 1984), for the proposition that employer intent is not
required in finding a constructive discharge. LINDEMANN & KAnUE, supra at 260
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Kennard looked to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's (hereinafter "EEOC") guidelines implementing
Title VII for an explanation of when an employer is responsible
for an employee's resignation. 165 The EEOC guidelines provide that an employer is responsible for sexual or racial harassment any time the employer (or its agents or supervisory
employees) knew or should have known of harassment in the
workplace, unless the employer can prove that it took appropriate immediate corrective action. 166 Kennard asserted that
every federal appellate court that has considered this issue has
found that, absent prompt remedial action, an employer with
only constructive knowledge is responsible for abusive
workplace conditions. 167 Furthermore, the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act (hereinafter "FEHA")168 also
imposes liability on an employer who fails to take corrective
action when it has actual or constructive knowledge of racial,
sexual and other forms of harassment by co-workers.169 Thus,

n.41. The Goss court, however, implied that the employer's actual knowledge of
the employee's intolerable circumstances was a prerequisite in proving constructive
discharge. "The court need merely find that the employer knowingly permitted
conditions of discrimination in employment so intolerable that a reasonable person
subject to them would resign." Goss, 747 F.2d at 888. Thus, the "element" of employer responsibility encompassing both constructive and actual knowledge cited by
Kennard is not supported by Lindemann and Kadue's analysis. See LINDEMANN &
KADUE, supra at 260.
165. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 et seq. (1993).
166. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1037 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.11(d)
(delineating employer liability for sexual harassment), 1606.8(d) (delineating employer liability for harassment because of national origin) (1993).
167. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1037 (Kennard, J., dissenting). The federal courts have
held employers responsible for workplace harassment when the employer knew or
should have known about abusive workplace conditions involving harassment based
on race or sex. See, e.g., Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 900-01
(1st Cir. 1988); Kotcher v. Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Ctr, Inc. 957 F.2d 59, 63
(2d Cir. 1992); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir.
1990); Nash v. Electrospace System, Inc., 9 F.3d 401, 403 (5th Cir. 1993);
Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., Autolite Div., 970 F.2d 178, 183 (6th Cir. 1992);
Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 957 F.2d 317, 320 (7th Cir.
1992); Hall v. Gus Const. Co., 842 F.2d lOlD, 1015 (8th Cir. 1988); Ellison v.
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1991); Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections
Dept., 916 F.2d 572, 577 (10th Cir. 1990); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc. 867
F.2d 1311, n. 1 (11th Cir. 1989).
168. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 12900 et seq. (West 1989).
169. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1037 (Kennard, J., dissenting). The California Government Code provides: "[hlarassment of an employee or applicant by an employee
other than an agent or supervisor shall be unlawful if the entity, or its agents or
supervisors, knows or should have known of this conduct and fails to take immedi-
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the dissent concluded that the constructive knowledge component of the Brady test for constructive discharge is supported
by analogous authority under Title VII and FEHA.170
The dissent argued that maintaining the constructive
knowledge standard was appropriate because circumstances
may exist where an employer should be liable despite having
only constructive knowledge. Kennard reasoned that when the
hostile work environment is created by the complaining
employee's co-workers or subordinates, an employer will often
have only constructive knowledge. l71 Furthermore, an employer has constructive knowledge if it does not give the employee any means to complain, discourages complaints or fails
to read or take employee complaints. 172 When these conditions are so obvious and pervasive that they should draw the
attention of a reasonably attentive employer, then the employer has constructive knowledge. 173 Thus, Kennard argued that
sound public policy and analogous legal authority support
maintaining the Brady standard of employer knowledge. 174
B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IMPROPER

Justice Kennard disagreed with the majority's conclusion
that Turner could not show objectively intolerable working
conditions or that a nexus existed between ABI's public policy
violations and Turner's resignation. 175 While Justice Kennard
conceded that the evidence of Turner's intolerable working
conditions was not overwhelming, summary judgment was
improper since sufficient triable issues of material fact remained.176 Specifically, the dissent contended that Turner's
supervisors may still have regarded him as a disloyal employee
despite the fact that a significant amount of time had passed

ate and appropriate corrective action." CAL. GoV'T CODE § 12940(h)(1) (West Supp.
1996).
170. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1038 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
171. [d. at 1037-38.
172. [d. at 1038.
173. [d.
174. [d.
175. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1038 (Cal. 1994) (Kennard,
J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 1042.
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between Turner complaints about statutory violations. 177
Thus, Kennard contended that the majority erred in finding
that Turner's claim did not implicate public policy because he
could not establish any link between his resignation and ABl's
statutory violations. 178
1. Intolerable conditions
The dissent argued that a reasonable employee might have
found his employer's efforts to force him from his job or set
him up for termination might be so intolerable as to compel
him to resign.179 Although Justice Kennard agreed with the
majority that negative performance appraisals do not independently create the type of conditions necessary to support a
constructive discharge claim, she argued that a campaign to
drive an employee from employment could well meet this standard. lso
Kennard found that Turner had presented sufficient tangible evidence to support his claim that he was driven to resign.181 For instance, Turner had offered uncontradicted evidence that his supervisors never mentioned any of the incidents of poor performance described in Turner's 1988 performance appraisal at the time that they had allegedly occurred. 182 Since this was contrary to normal and sound personnel practices, the dissent gave credence to Turner's claim
that he was being "set up" for termination. 183 Furthermore,
Turner had produced evidence that ABI had used similar
methods to force resignations on other occasions. l84 Kennard
also found it inexplicable that Turner had suddenly become an
unsatisfactory employee after four years of receiving uniformly
good performance evaluations. 185

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

[d. at 1043.
[d.
[d. at 1042.
[d.
Turner, 876 P.2d at 1041-42 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
[d. at 1042.
[d.
[d.
[d.
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The dissent found this evidence sufficient for a trier of fact
to find that ABI had, indeed, used a systematic campaign to
drive Turner from his job. 186 A reasonable employee, knowing
the poor evaluations would continue, eventually lead to discharge, and also might lead to reduced employment prospects
in the future, might very well find the situation so intolerable
as to warrant resignation, the dissent argued. 187
2. Nexus between Turner's 1989 resignation and ABI's 1984
statutory violations
Justice Kennard contended that Turner had produced
sufficient triable evidence that ABI may have forced his 1989
resignation at least partially in retaliation for his 1984 whistle-blowing activities. ISS ABI manager George Liakos may
have tolerated or encouraged the illegal conduct alleged by
Turner because it may have increased company sales. 189
Thus, the dissent argued, a reasonable jury could infer that
Turner's supervisor's ordered his 1985 transfer to prevent him
from observing any further illegal or improper activities. 190
The dissent also maintained that a jury could trace a causal
sequence from Turner's initial complaints, through his continued agitation while assigned to the delivery department, and
finally to the negative performance appraisal which he claimed
had caused him to resign.19l Thus, the dissent found Turner's
evidence sufficient to avoid summary judgment on the issue of
whether his supervisors had endeavored either to "set him up"
for termination or to force him to resign. 192

186. [d.
187. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1042 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
188. [d. at 1042-43. The majority held that one reason Turner's constructive
discharge claim failed was that he could not establish a nexus between his complaints about illegal activities in 1984 and his resignation in 1989. [d. at 1032.
The court ruled that any connection between the events of 1984 and Turner's
resignation was obliterated by the good performance appraisals Turner received
during the interim. [d. Moreover, the majority found Turner's statement that he
resigned because he thought he would fare better in litigation a strong indication
that no connection existed. [d.
189. Id. at 1042-43.
190. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1042 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
191. [d. at 1043.
192. Id.
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Justice Kennard, found the four-year interval between
Turner's initial complaints and his eventual resignation not so
temporally distant as to summarally eliminate a causal inference. 193 Whether Turner's complaints regarding the 1984
statutory violations had "marked" him as a disloyal employee
was a question properly left for the jury.194 The dissent found
it entirely plausible that a legally sophisticated employer
might allow some time to pass before reinstigating a campaign
to force an employee to resign or be fired. 195
Although retaliation for Turner's complaints regarding
violations of union contracts and internal company policies
would not have violated public policy,196 the dissent contended that Turner's complaints may have given his superiors
continuing grounds to regard him as a disloyal employee and
troublemaker. 197 Thus, Turner's belief that his supervisors
were attempting to force him from the company through adverse performance appraisals was amply supported by the
evidence. 198
To demonstrate the required "nexus," Kennard argued,
Turner need only prove that his December 1988 performance
appraisal was given partially in retaliation for his opposition to
statutory violations in 1984. 199 However, if the 1988 performance appraisal was given solely in retaliation for improper
practices that did not involve statutory violations, Kennard
would agree with the majority that Turner's constructive discharge did not violate a public policy.200 In Kennard's view,
however, the potentially mixed motives of Turner's supervisors

193. [d: at 1043. The majority opinion did not dispute that giving gifts to retailers and encouraging employees to remove competitors' advertisements violated
the Alcohol Beverage Control Act. Id. at 1042. The majority also did not dispute
that discharging an employee in retaliation for opposition to such activities would
have violated public policy. [d.
194. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1043 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
195. [d.
196. [d. at 1042, n. 7. Justice Kennard agreed with the majority's conclusion
that violations of collective bargaining agreements and internal company policies
did not violate fundamental public policy. Id.
197. Id. at 1043
198. [d.
199. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1042-43 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
200. [d.
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presented an issue of material fact properly left to the trier of
fact.201
VI. CRITIQUE

The Turner court erred in reinstating the trial court's
summary judgment order in favor of ABI because the majority
incorrectly decided or refused to resolve three triable issues of
material fact.202 First, the court incorrectly decided as a matter of law that Turner's supervisors did not engage in a campaign to force him from his job even though Turner had produced sufficient evidence to warrant a trial on the issue of his
supervisor's motives. 203 Second, the court never reached the
issue of whether such a campaign might have created intolerable circumstances since the court incorrectly found that
Turner's supervisors did not attempt to coerce or harass him to
resign.204 Finally, the court improperly decided as a matter of
law that ABI did not give Turner unfavorable performance
appraisals in retaliation for his complaints about violations of
the ABC Act in 1984 and thus did not implicate fundamental
public policy.205
201. Id. at 1043.
202. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022 (Cal. 1994). The California
Code of Civil Procedure provides:
The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all
the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In determining
whether the papers show that there is no triable issue as
to any material fact the court shall consider all of the
evidence set forth in the papers, except that to which
objections have been made and sustained by the court,
and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence,
except summary judgment shall not be granted by the
court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the
evidence, if contradicted by other inferences or evidence,
which raise a triable issue as to any material fact.
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c) (West 1995). Thus, a defendant moving for summary
judgment must show facts negating all causes of action on all theories contained
in the complaint. Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Superior Court, 184 Cal. Rptr. 98, 102
(1982). Because summary judgment is seen as a drastic remedy, the court should
resolve doubts about the propriety of granting the motion in favor of the party
opposing the motion. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 563 (Cal. 1968).
203. See infra Section IV.A. for further discussion.
204. See infra Section IV.B. for further discussion.
205. See infra Section IV.C. for further discussion.
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These errors are significant because they demonstrate the
Turner majority's failure to recognize that an employer might
use fabricated performance appraisals to force an employee to
resign, or, alternatively, to justify a wrongful discharge. Furthermore, courts will now likely find that a whistle-blowing
employee's constructive discharge was unrelated to the
employee's complaints if sufficient time has passed between
the complaints and the forced resignation. Thus, employees
facing a similar situation are likely doomed to adverse judgment as a matter of law since they will be unable to prove the
required "nexus,,206 between their complaints and their forced
resignation.
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE A TRIABLE
ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT REMAINED AS TO WHETHER ABI
MANAGERS USED FABRICATED PERFORMANCE APPRAlSALS
TO FORCE TURNER'S RESIGNATION

With very little discussion, the Turner majority dismissed
Turner's claim that his 1988 performance appraisal had been
part of a concerted effort to orchestrate his discharge or resignation. 207 The court stated that Turner's claim amounted to
nothing more than an attempt to "weave unrelated and disjointed events together into an insidious pattern" which quickly unraveled under the circumstances. 2os Furthermore, the
court found that Turner had presented insufficient evidence to
prove that any ABI managers had regarded Turner as a disloyal employee. 209 The court also noted that the ABI managers
responsible for Turner's earlier negative evaluations were no
longer on the scene. 210 Moreover, the prompt investigation of
Turner's complaints undertaken by ABI further dispelled any
notion there was a concerted effort to harass Turner.21l The
court also found that Turner had resigned voluntarily for strategic reasons and thus could not show that his supervisors had
coerced or compelled him to leave ABI. 212 The court found the
206.
207.
208.
209.

Turner, 876 P.2d at 1032.
Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1032 (Cal. 1994).
[d.
[d. at 1034.

210. [d.

211. Id. at 1034.
212. Turner, P.2d at 1032. Turner admitted resigning when he did because he
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favorable performance ratings Turner had received during the
period of more than three years between the events of 1984
and his 1988 negative performance appraisal strong evidence
that no mischief was afoot.213 The court concluded that
Turner's 1988 negative evaluation could reflect only a bona
fide assessment of Turner's job performance and could not
have constituted an attempt at reprisaL 214
The majority's examination of the facts, however, failed to
sufficiently address the contradictory evidence offered by Turner to show a genuine issue as to whether Turner's negative
appraisals objectively evaluated Turner's performance or
whether ABI managers had used them to "set up" Turner for
discharge. 215 In contrast, Justice Kennard's dissent correctly
concluded that Turner had produced sufficient evidence to
create a triable issue of material fact and thus avoid summary
judgment.216 Based on the evidence presented by Turner, a
jury could have found that ABI had engaged in conduct designed to force to Turner to resign or to "set him up" for discharge. 217
In support of his claim, Turner presented evidence that
the unfavorable performance appraisals in both 1984 and 1988
came on the heels of his complaints about improper practices
at ABI. 218 Turner claimed that he did not deserve the unfavorable ratings since his performance at ABI had been of consistently high quality.219 Moreover, Turner argued that his
supervisors' failure to discuss instances of poor performance
with him when they occurred was further proof that his superthought his "chances would be better" in future litigation if he preempted his
discharge. [d.
213. [d.
214. [d. at 1034-35.
215. [d. at 1041-42 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard argued that Turner had produced sufficient evidence to show that his supervisors had engaged in a
campaign to force him from his job. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1041-42 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Any evidence supplied by the defendants, Kennard asserted, simply established the existence of a triable issue of fact. [d.
216. See id. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46, 63 (Cal. 1988).
217. See supra note 218.
218. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1042 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
219. [d.
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visors had been intent on forcing his departure from ABI since
such conduct was not in line with normal personnel practices. 220 Turner also recounted how ABI had retaliated against
another employee (Van Hoy) for complaining about improper
activities on the job. 221 Thus, a trier of fact could have inferred that ABI had given Turner the negative performance
appraisals to further some illegitimate goal and not objectively
assess his job performance. 222
Furthermore, Turner produced anecdotal evidence that
ABI had used negative performance appraisals in the past to
force other employees to resign their positions. 223 Turner described three instances where ABI used fabricated performance
appraisals to encourage specific employees to resign.224 Thus,
Turner presented at least some evidence that ABI supervisors
were inclined to use fabricated performance appraisals to force
employees to resign.
Even though different managers had appraised Turner in
1984 and 1988, this fact should not have undercut Turner's
claim because each manager reported to the same individual
general manager. 225 While different individuals supervised
Turner at each department, each supervisor, in turn, reported
to George Liakos, the general manager. 226 Liakos was not only in Turner's direct chain of command, but was also involved
in all of Turner's appraisals and was responsible for Turner's
1985 transfer. 227
As Justice Kennard correctly maintained, a jury could
have concluded that Liakos transferred Turner to the delivery
department in 1985 so that Turner would not continue to draw
attention to profitable but illegal activities occurring in the
220. [d.
221. [d. at 1041 n. 6.
222. See id. at 1042. Justice Kennard found sufficient evidence for a trier of
fact to detennine that Liakos, Schmitt and Garcia had conspired to tenninate
Turner to prevent him from continuing his complaints regarding violations of the
ABC Act and ABI's internal policies. [d.
223. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1041 n.6 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
224. [d.
225. [d. at 1034.
226. Id. at 1040.
227. [d. at 1039-40.
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sales department. 228 The jury could further infer that
Turner's continued complaints while assigned to the delivery
department led Turner's supervisors to embark on a campaign
to force him to resign.229 Moreover, the assertion that ABI
managers were likely to use performance appraisals to harass
employees had sufficient evidentiary support since Turner
alleged that ABI had taken similar action in the past.230
Turner had also produced sufficient evidence to create a
triable issue of fact as to whether his supervisors at ABI used
his performance appraisals to force him to resign. Byoverlooking evidence produced by the Turner, the Turner majority
incorrectly found Turner's appraisals to be objective performance evaluations. 231 However, even if Turner could have
shown that his supervisors gave him the performance appraisals in retaliation for his complaints, Turner's supervisors' conduct would only have amounted to a constructive discharge if
his working conditions had become so intolerable that he
would have felt compelled or coerced to resign.232
B.

INCORRECT BECAUSE ABI's
EFFORT TO FORCE TuRNER To RESIGN MAy HAVE BEEN
INTOLERABLE

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

WAS

Since the Turner court concluded that no ABI supervisors
had tried to force Turner's resignation, the majority never
reached the issue of whether such a situation would be sufficiently intolerable to compel a reasonable person to resign.233
By focusing only on minor parts of Turner's overall claim, the
court incorrectly concluded that Turner's resignation was unjustified because his employment conditions were not intolera-

228. Id at 1042.
229. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1042 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
230. See supra notes 224 - 227 and accompanying text for further discussion.
231. See Turner, 876 P.2d at 1034. The fact that Turner's performance appraisals appeared objective "on their face" and the fact that three years had passed between Turner's complaints about illegal activities and the time he received the
negative performance appraisal in 1988 was sufficient for the Turner majority to
determine that Turner's negative performance appraisal was simply a bona fide
assessment of his job performance. Id.
232. Id. at 1026-27.
233. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022 (Cal. 1994).
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ble as a matter of law. 234 By taking this myopic view, the majority failed to consider whether an employee is justified to
resign when faced with virtually certain termination in the
near future. 235
In contrast, other courts considering constructive discharge
claims have found that imminent termination creates working
conditions sufficiently intolerable that a reasonable person
would feel compelled to resign. For example, in Lopez v. S.B.
Thomas, Inc.,236 an employee claimed that his employer constructively discharged him when his supervisor told him that
he would be discharged in 90 days. The court held that such a
statement by an employer alone suffices to present a triable
issue as to whether a constructive discharge had occurred. 237
Likewise, in Welch v. University of Texas & Its Marine Science
Institute,238 a professor told his graduate research assistant
that she would have to resign after being awarded her doctorate since the professor believed a female with an advanced
degree was inappropriate for the position. The court held that
the trial court had not erred in finding constructive discharge
since "a reasonable person would certainly resign employment
after being ordered to leave. "239

234. [d. at 1032 (concluding that Turner'8 resignation was voluntary and strategic, not coerced or compelled).
235. See id. at 1042 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard argued that a
trier of fact could find a campaign to force an employee to resign would be objectively intolerable and could compel a reasonable employee to resign. [d. The majority, however, reviewed only parts of the alleged "campaign" with regard to their
intolerability. C.f Calhoun v. Acme Cleveland Corp., 798 F.2d 559, 562-63, 564
(1st Cir. 1986). In Calhoun, the court held that the courts should focus on the
overall circumstances in determining whether employment conditions are intolerable. [d. The court chastised the court below for applying a "divide and conquer"
approach to determining intolerability. [d. Likewise, in Turner, the court divided
Turner's claim of intolerable working conditions into its most tolerable elements.
The court found that, alone, neither observing illegal acts, Turner, 876 P.2d at
1034, observing violations of ABI's internal procedures, id. at 1033, nor being
subjected to unfavorable performance appraisals, id. at 1032, were sufficiently
egregious to amount to intolerable circumstances. As noted by Justice Kennard in
her dissent, however, Turner's claim was that these elements simply went toward
proving that Turner's supervisors had engaged in a campaign to force him from
his job. [d. at 1041-42. Thus, like the court below in Calhoun, the Turner court
divided Turner's claim into subparts that are much easier to swallow.
236. 831 F.2d ll84, ll88 (2d Cir. 1987).
237. [d.
238. 659 F.2d 531, 534 (5th Cir. 1981).
239. [d.
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Similarly, Justice Kennard's dissent recognized that the
proper issue was whether an attempt to coerce an employee to
resign by using deliberately fabricated performance appraisals
would amount to objectively intolerable circumstances. 240
Since the degree of intolerability is measured by an reasonable-person standard, courts have recognized that the issue of
whether an action or condition of employment is intolerable is
normally a question of fact best left for the jury.241 Courts
have also recognized, however, that situations may exist where
an employee's decision to resign is unreasonable as a matter of
law. 242
The Turner court held that Turner's case fell among the
latter since his working conditions were not intolerable as a
matter of law. 243 First, the court concluded that Turner's exposure to illegal and improper activities at the workplace was
not intolerable since the nature of the conduct was not obnoxious or aggravated enough to cause a reasonable employee to
resign.244 Furthermore, the court found that Turner could not
claim the illegal acts he observed in 1984 created intolerable
circumstances in 1989 when Turner resigned. 245 Rather than
asking whether· a reasonable person would feel compelled to
resign if faced with imminent dismissal, the court instead
mistakenly focused on whether the illegal acts Turner witnessed or whether Turner's adverse performance appraisals
standing alone created intolerable working conditions. 246 Al240. Kennard wrote:
The question, then, is not whether one, or even two, ad·
verse perfonnance reviews justify an employee's decision
to resign. Rather, the issue is whether a reasonable em·
ployee would find working conditions intolerable, and feel
compelled to resign, when the employee's supervisors had
launched a campaign to drive the employee out of the
company by means of adverse perfonnance evaluations,
based on charges deliberately fabricated.
Turner, 876 P.2d at 1042 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
241. See, e.g., Thomas v. Douglas, 877 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989), Soules
v. Cadam, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 11 (Ct. App. 1991), Valdez v. City of Los Angeles,
282 Cal. Rptr. 726, 733 (Ct. App. 1991).
242. See, e.g., Soules, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 11; Valdez, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
243. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1032.
244. [d.
245. [d.
246. See id. (holding that Turner could not show intolerable circumstances from
the evidence produced).
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though the Turner court correctly decided that Turner's negative performance appraisals independently did not create an
objectively intolerable situation,247 the court failed to consider
whether employers might use fabricated appraisals as a message to employees that they have no future with the company
and thereby creating intolerable working conditions for the
employee. 248
The Turner court relied on Soules v. Cadam, Inc. 249 as
support for the proposition that an employer must, from time
to time, evaluate and criticize its employees if it wishes to
function as an efficient business enterprise. 250 In Soules, the
employee claimed she was constructively discharged because
she was given a negative performance appraisal accompanied
by a demotion. 251 Soules is distinguishable, however, because
the Soules' employer had not intended the negative appraisal
to cause Soules to resign.252 Unlike the plaintiff in Soules,
Turner alleged that his supervisors had intended to use the
appraisal to force him from the company and not as part of a
remedial company policy designed to promote workplace efficiency.253 Thus, the court failed to address the central issue
framed by Turner: whether imminent discharge is sufficiently
intolerable to cause a reasonable employee to resign.
Although the majority opinion is unclear as to whether a
constructive discharge of an employee through the use of fabricated performance appraisals is possible,254 the Turner decision provides unscrupulous employers legal ammunition to use
performance appraisals in a similar manner. Under the Turner
decision, employers may be able to avoid litigating the merits

247. Id at 1032. The Turner majority noted that "every employer must on occasion [use performance appraisals to] review, criticize, demote, transfer, and discipline employees" in order to properly manage its business. Id (citations omitted).
248. See Turner, 876 P.2d at 1042. (Kennard, J. dissenting). Kennard contended
that Turner produced sufficient evidence that his supervisors engaged in such
underhanded tactics to force him from his job. Id.
249. 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6 (1991).
250. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1032; Soules, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 12.
251. Id. at 9.
252. Id. In fact, after the employee had resigned, the employer informed her by
mail that she was "absolutely welcome" to return to her job. Id.
253. See Turner, 876 P.2d at 1041 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
254. See id. at 1036 (Mosk J., concurring and dissenting).
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of constructive discharge claims where an employee claims the
employer has fabricated performance appraisals to force a
resignation if the appraisals themselves appear facially valid. 255
C. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE ABI
VIOLATED PuBLIC POLICY BY DISCHARGING TuRNER IN
RETALIATION FOR HIS COMPLAINTS

The majority incorrectly found that Turner had not presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact concerning whether his supervisors constructively discharged him
in retaliation for his complaints about illegal activity he observed in 1984.256 However, assuming Turner's discharge was
in retaliation for his complaints, the question then becomes
whether such a retaliatory discharge would have violated fundamental public policy.257
1. The Turner court incorrectly decided that ABI did not
discharge Turner in retaliation for his complaints in 1984
Turner claimed that his supervisors deliberately fabricated
his performance appraisals in retaliation for his history of
complaints about allegedly improper and illegal activities he
witnessed while employed at ABI. 258 The court, however,
ruled that Turner's allegation of retaliation fails because Turner did not resign until approximately five years after the occurrence of the only illegal activities that may have implicated
public policy.259 The dissent correctly noted that the passage
of time between Turner's original reporting activities and his
eventual resignation should not have been sufficient to elimi-

255. See id. at 1034-35 (majority op.) Because Turner's 1988 performance appraisal appeared valid on its face and because it was given nearly three years
after Turner's complaints about illegal activities, the court found that it reflected a
bona fide assessment of Turner's performance on the job. 1d.
256. See Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1041-42 (Cal. 1994)
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
257. See id. at 1043.
258. [d. at 1041-42.
259. [d. at 1034.
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nate any causal relationship as a matter of law. 260 Turner
produced evidence of a causal sequence beginning with his
reporting of illegal activities in 1984, leading to his transfer to
the delivery department in 1985, his continuing reporting
activities while at the delivery department, and finally culminating in the final fabricated performance appraisal in late
1988. 261 Thus, although the statutory violations giving rise to
the public policy element of Turner's constructive discharge
claim were somewhat removed in time from Turner's eventual
resignation, a jury could have decided as fact that a causal
relationship did indeed exist. 262
2. ABI violated public policy by retaliating against Turner

Even if Turner had created a triable issue of fact as to
whether his supervisors used fabricated performance appraisals to drive him from his job, summary judgment would still
have been proper if Turner could not show that his discharge
violated some fundamental public policy.263 An employee has
a cause of action for tortious wrongful discharge if the employee is fired for performing an act that public policy would encourage, or for refusing to do something that public policy
would condemn. 264 However, difficulties arise in determining
whether a claim genuinely involves public policy or a lesser
controversy.265 Accordingly, the policy in question must not
only affect society at large, but must also be delineated in
constitutional or statutory provisions. 266 Thus, to avoid summary judgment, Turner was required to show, at a minimum,
that his discharge violated some public policy set out in a statute or constitution. 267
As noted by both the majority and the dissent, the only

260. See id at 1043.
261. [d.
262. See Turner, 876 P.2d at 1043 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
263. See supra notes 63 - 75 for further discussion of public policy in the constructive discharge context.
264. Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, 824 P.2d 680, 684 (Cal. 1992); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 379 (Cal. 1988).
265. GanU, 824 P.2d at 687.
266. [d. at 684, 687.
267. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1032-33.
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potential public policy element of Turner's claim arises out of
his complaints regarding allegedly illegal activities observed at
ABI in 1984. 268 The majority chastised Turner for failing to
identify violations of specific statutory or constitutional provisions that might have implicated fundamental public policy.269 The majority maintained that Turner's reference to only
one provision of the ABC Act270 put both ABI and the court
"in the position of having to guess at the nature of the public
policies involved, if any.,,271 Thus, the court found Turner's
claim "plainly insufficient" to create an issue of fact as to
whether public policy had been violated. 272
The majority further ruled that even if Turner had had
statutory support, merely witnessing violations of the ABC Act
did not implicate public policy.273 The court found Turner's
claim rested on an allegation of whistle-blower harassment
since Turner could not show his supervisor's discharged him
for refusing to participate in any illegal act.274 However, the
court also found that Turner could not show his employers
forced his resignation in retaliation for his complaints because
his resignation in 1988 was too far removed from the allegedly
illegal acts of 1984. 275
In so holding, the majority did not consider whether ABI
may have violated public policy by constructively discharging
Turner in retaliation for his complaints about the alleged ABC
Act violations. 276 The majority opinion did not discuss whether a retaliatory discharge for complaints to one's own employer
regarding illegal acts would violate public policy. Although the

268. [d. at 1033-34 (majority op.), 1042 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
269. [d. at 1033 (majority op.).

270. See supra notes 13, 14 and 144 for complete discussion of the statutory
violations alleged by Turner and those considered by the majority.
271. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1033.
272. [d.
273. [d. at 1034.
274. [d.
275. [d.
276. See id. Because the Turner majority found Turner's resignation too far removed from any alleged violations of public policy to justify a trial on the merits,
Turner, 876 P.2d at 1034, the court never reached the issue of whether an orchestrated campaign to force an employee to resign, such as alleged by Turner, would
have violated public policy.
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majority agreed that violations of the ABC Act might implicate
a fundamental public policy,277 the court rejected Turner's
public policy claim in the "classic Tameny278 sense" because
ABI never asked Turner to participate in any illegal activity
and did not harass him for fulfilling any legal duty or for exerting any statutory prerogative. 279 Therefore, the court held
Turner's only potential claim was that he was discharged in
retaliation for reporting an alleged statutory violation. 280 The
court's finding that insufficient evidence existed to show a
nexus between the statutory violations of the 1984 and
Turner's eventual resignation necessarily precluded any discussion of whether retaliation for Turner's complaints might have
violated public policy.281
In a similar situation, the Court of Appeal in Blom v.
N.G.K Spark Plugs (U.S.A.), Inc.,282 considered whether discharging an employee in retaliation for his attempts to rectify
his employer's violations of the law violated public policy. 283
In Blom, N.G.K. Spark Plugs had hired Blom as personnel
manager and had given him instructions to "Americanize" the
corporation's disproportionately Japanese staff. 2M However,
when Blom attempted to comply with FEHA285 and Title
VII,286 N.G.K. Spark Plugs terminated Blom in retaliation for
his efforts. 287 The court held that the legislative purpose underlying FEHA and Title VII would be undermined if employers were allowed to terminate employees for "protesting working conditions which they reasonably believe constitute a hazard to their own health or safety, or the health or safety of others. "288 The court ruled that achieving the statutory objective

277. Id.
278. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (holding that
an employer who discharges an employee who refuses to participate in an illegal
price fixing scheme is liable in tort).
279. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1033-34.
280. Id.
281. See id.
282. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139 (Ct. App. 1992).
283. Id. at 143.
284. Id. at 140.
285. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 12900 et seq. (West 1989).
286. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e et seq. (1989).
287. Blom, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 140.
288. Id. at 143.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss3/7

40

Meckes: Constructive Discharge

1996]

CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE

715

of a safe and healthy work environment for all employees requires that employees be free to call their employer's attention
to illegal practices within the employee's knowledge. 289 Making the employer aware of illegal activities and giving the
employer the opportunity to take corrective action, the court
held, is important to effectuating the statutory intent. 29o
Thus, a common law action in tort arises when an employer
discharges an employee in retaliation for resisting employer
violations of the law that secure fundamental public policies. 291
Likewise, Turner's discharge in retaliation for his complaints to his supervisors about the illegal activity he observed
in 1984 also violated public policy.292 In enacting the ABC
Act, the California Legislature declared that the subject matter
of the Act "involves in the highest degree the economic, social,
and moral well-being and the safety of the State and of all its
people. »293 Therefore, the termination of an employee for attempting to effect the purposes of the ABC Act must also implicate a fundamental public policy.294 Thus, because Turner
presented sufficient evidence that ABI discharged him in retaliation for his complaints about illegal conduct he observed in
1984, Turner's discharge must also have violated public policy.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., the California Supreme
Court held that Turner, an executive employee, could not
maintain his claim for constructive wrongful discharge as a
matter of law. 295 The Turner court's finding that the mere
passage of time had dispelled any causal relationship between
Turner's reporting activities in 1984 and his resignation in
1989 bodes ill for employees working for legally savvy employers. As Justice Kennard noted in her dissent, a legally sophisti289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See id. at 1042-43 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
293. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23001(West 1985), see supra note 145 for the
legislature's declaration of purpose included in the ABC Act.
294. See Turner, 876 P.2d at 1042-43 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
295. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1024 (Cal. 1994).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996

41

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 7

716

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:675

cated employer might elect to allow some interval of time to
pass before taking illicit action against an employee it regards
as disloya1. 296 Thus, in a claim for whistle-blower harassment
similar to Turner's, an employer might choose to allow some
time to pass before engaging in any activity designed to constructively discharge the employee. While a court might recognize that the employer would have violated fundamental public
policy had the discharge taken place earlier, the court would
feel constrained by Turner to grant a motion for summary
judgment if there were any question whether the employee can
prove a nexus between the reporting activity and the discharge.
This note has argued that the California Supreme Court's
reinstatement of the trial court's summary judgment order was
flawed since it failed to recognize three material issues of fact
presented by Turner.297 First, Turner produced evidence that
his supervisors engaged in a campaign to use fabricated performance appraisals to force Turner to resign or to "set him up"
for eventual discharge. Second, since the court found Turner's
employer did not try to force Turner's resignation, the court
failed to reach the issue of whether such action would constitute intolerable circumstances. Finally, the court held that
Turner's claim failed to state a public policy claim since it
incorrectly found his resignation was too remote in time for
him to show any connection between his whistle-blowing activity and his eventual discharge. As a result of the Turner decision, an unscrupulous employer may use fabricated performance appraisals to force the resignation of an employee with
near impunity. After Turner, an employer need only allow a
significant amount of time to pass between an incident implicating public policy and the termination of an employee to
avoid incurring liability for a constructive wrongful discharge.

Joseph A. Meckes·

296. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1043 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
297. See supra notes 202 - 295 and accompanying text.
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